Judicial Construction of Certain Provisions of the Workmen\u27s Compensation Act by Barry, John S.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 17
Issue 3 April 1933 Article 2
Judicial Construction of Certain Provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act
John S. Barry
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
John S. Barry, Judicial Construction of Certain Provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 17 Marq. L. Rev. 174 (1933).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol17/iss3/2
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CERTAIN
PROVISIONS OF THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT
JOHN S. BARRY*
F OR many years prior to 1911 the Wisconsin Supreme Court urged
the state legislature to pass a Workmen's Compensation Act. The
development of the use of high powered, high speed machinery of all
types had seriously increased the dangers of employment. When one of
these machines broke down and refused to function, no expense was
spared to replace it or repair it. But when the health of a workman
broke down under the strain and stress of labor at high speed, or when
through inadvertence he became injured, all of the loss through his en-
forced unemployment fell on his shoulders. The industry paid nothing
except in cases when the workman was able to establish in the courts
that his loss of health or injury was solely caused by the negligent -f
the employer. With the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption
of risk and the fellow-servant rule, it was not an easy matter for the
workman to collect damages in those days; and when recovery was had
it entailed considerable expense, both for the workman and the
employer.
To relieve this situation the legislature in 1911 passed the Work-
men's Compensation Act. If one is not informed as to the merits of that
legislation, let him read the opinion of Justice Marshall in the case of
Milwaukee v. Millerla The learned jurist there justified the Act in
these words:
"No considerate person will indulge the thought of even a partial
backward step toward the old system, characterized by incalcuable
waste to the detriment of every consumer of the products of human
energy; by distressing unequal distribution of misfortunes incident to
necessary industrial pursuits, particularly misfortunes to employees by
personal injury losses; by a lowering tendency of moral standards in
the making and enforcing claims for such losses, and by perversion of
human perceptions of individual responsibility in such cases. The law
is a long step towards an ideal system requiring every consumer of any
product of human industry, as directly as practicable, to pay his ratable
proportion of the fair money cost of those things which he necessarily
or reasonably destroys in conserving his life and welfare,-personal
injury losses, not intentionally incurred,--losses whether through the
fault of the employer or employee, or without fault of either, being
considered as legitimately an element of such fair money cost as ex-
penditures for raw material, for machinery or wages."
la 154 Wis. 652, 144 N.V. 188 (1913).
* Member of the Milwaukee Bar.
la 154 Wis. 652, 144 N.W. 188 (1913).
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With that clear declaration of its understanding of the sympathetic
human element involved, our courts have proceeded to construe the
Act, in all of its provisions, with great liberality-keeping uppermost at
all times as the dominant rule of construction that labor should be rea-
sonably compensated for all losses incident to industry.
It is not the purpose of this article to give much consideration to the
administrative feature of the Act. The statutes are clear and explicit,
and we give a brief outline of some of the outstanding features. The
Industrial Commission is charged with the duty of administering the
law. That body has broad powers, fixes rules and regulations for safe-
guarding industrial workers in their places of employment, investigates
manufacturing plants and places of employment, receives reports of all
industrial accidents and hears and determines all unadjusted claims for
compensation under the Act.' The state and municipalities and their
various subdivisions and departments, and all private employers, ex-
ce-'*jig farmers, employing three or more employees and others who
may voluntarily elect to accept the provisions of the Act, are required
to pay compensation to employees suffering disabling injury while
employed.
2
Employers under the Act are required either to carry insurance
against liability under the Act or to satisfy the commission of financial
ability to meet such liability.3
Persons employing contractors who are not subject to the Act or
who have failed to insure against liability are liable for compensation
to the employees of such contractor.4
Compensation is based upon the average earnings or earning capac-
ity of injured employees.' No allowance is made for pain and suffering.
The employer is required to meet all necessary expense for medical,
surgical and hospital care and treatment. Employers are required to
keep a list of physicians from which the employee may select his attend-
ing physician. Provision is made for employees who prefer Christian
Science or Chiropractic treatments, but the employer is given the right
to elect not to ,be subject to such provision.6
The amounts to be paid for compensation are fixed by statute to
which reference should be had in every instance. Space does not per-
mit setting forth the schedules here.7
1 Chapter 101, Wis. Stats.
2 See. 102.04, Wis. Stats.
3 Sec. 102.28, Wis. Stats.
4 Sec. 102.06, Wis. Stats.
5 Sec. 102.11, Wis. Stats.
6 Sec. 102.42, Wis. Stats.
7 Sec. 102.43 to Sec. 102.62 inclusive, Wis. Stats.
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In most instances the compensation to injured employees is taken
care of by the employer or his insurance carrier without the aid of the
Industrial Commission. Whenever a controversy arises between the
employee and the employer, or his insurance carrier, either as to liabil-
ity of the employer or the amount of compensation, any party in inter-
est may file an application with the commission, which fixes a time for
hearing the application, not more than forty days after the date of
filing such application. The commission establishes the necessary rules
of practice, but the hearing is conducted in much the same manner as
trials by a court without a jury." Application by an employee must be
made within six years from the date of injury or death.9
After the completion of its hearing the commission makes and files
its findings of fact together with the award of compensation. The com-
mission may reopen the case within three years if it appears a mistake
has been made in the award when the employee in fact was suffering
from an occupational disease.10
Either party may have judgment on such award, without notice, by
presenting a certified copy of the award to the circuit court of any
county."
Any party aggrieved by the award may within thirty days from the
date of the award commence an action against the commission in the
circuit court for Dane County for review. On such review the findings
of fact made by the commission acting within its powers shall, in the
absence of fraud, be conclusive, and the award of the commission can
be set aside only on the grounds (a) that the commission acted without
or in excess of its powers, (b) that the order or award was procured
by fraud, or (c) that the order or award is not supported by the com-
mission's findings of fact.12 An appeal from the decision of the circuit
court in such action may be taken, but without filing undertaking for
costs, within the time and in the manner provided for an appeal from
the order of the circuit court,'2 that is within thirty days from date of
service of notice of entry of the circuit court order.14
It must be borne in mind that the court in the action to review is
limited strictly to a review of the commission's record. The commis-
sion's findings of fact, though against what may appear to be the great
weight or clear preponderance of the evidence, cannot be disregarded
8 Sec. 102.16, 102.17, Wis. Stats.
9 Sec. 102.17 Subd. (4) Wis. Stats.
10 Sec. 102.18 Wis. Stats.
11 Sec. 102.20, Wis. Stats.
12 Sec. 102.23, Wis. Stats.
13 Sec. 102.25, Wis. Stats.
14 Sec. 274.04, Wis. Stats.
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if there is some credible evidence to support the finding.15 Before com-
mencing an action to review an award the attorney should give careful
consideration to the fact that the powers of the court are so limited.'
One of the prime considerations for the adoption of the legislation
was the advisability of eliminating litigation in connection with in-
dustral injuries, primarily for the protection of injured employees.
It is deemed of interest, however, to the student to make a study of
those features of the Act which have been subject to judicial construc-
tion. it should be noted that the legislature, in its wisdom, has limited
the fees which attorneys may charge for services in the prosecution of
claims under the Act to such an extent that many attorneys decline to
accept such cases."7 Comparatively few cases require the employment
of counsel by the injured employee, or his representatives, but every
attorney should know how the law should be applied, and no attorney
should refuse his aid in solving doubtful questions. Four questions will
be considered here:
(1) Who is an employee?
(2) What is "service growing out of and incidental" to employ-
ment?
(3) What is included within the term "injury"?
(4) How is the liability of third persons affected by the Act?
WHO Is AN EmPLOYEE?
There is omitted from the discussion of this question consideration
of the law so far as it affects employees of the state and municipalities.
Sec. 102.67 (4) and (5) defines employees of private employers as
follows:
"Every person in the service of another under any contract of hire,
express or implied, all helpers and assistants of employees, whether
paid by the employer or employee, but not including farm laborers,
domestic servants and any person whose employment is not in the
course of a trade, business, profession, or occupation of his employer,
unless such employer has elected to include them" and "a working
member of a partnership receiving wages irrespective of profits from
such partnership shall be deemed an employee."
(a) Distinction between Employee and Independent Contractor:
The relation of employer and employee exists where one, perform-
ing work for another, does so under a contract, express or implied,
which compels the one performing to do work under the control of the
15 Tesch v. Ind. Comm., 200 Wis. 616, 229 N.W. 194 (1930) ; Gerue v. Medford
Bridge Co., 205 Wis. 235, 236 N.W. 528 (1931).
16 International H. Co. v. id. Co-mm., 157 Wis. 167, 147 N.W. 53 (1913).
1 Sec. 102.26, Wis. Stats.
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employer and at the same time gives to the employer the right to direct
the other's conduct, to dismiss him from the service, and to have at all
times authoritative control over the work. So that when a relationship
is established between two, under which in order to maintain the rela-
tionship, one is subject to the direction of the other, such other having
the responsibility and right of control of the work, the one is an
employee and the other an employer.'
One, however, who undertakes, for compensation, to perform serv-
ice for another, in the performanc of which the contracting party uses
his own tools and material with liberty to pursue any means deemed
proper and desirable on the work, the details of which are left to his
judgment, is not an employee but an independent contractor, 19 and
this is true even though the party for whom the work is done reserves
such supervision as is reasonably necessary to see that the ultimate re-
sult contemplated by the contract is produced. 20
Where one accepts employment with another for agreed wages,
there is of course no problem, but in situations where the employment
is not of a continuous and fixed character the line of demarcation is
far from clear. One, who for an agreed price, undertakes to paint the
house of another, is an independent contractor, and if injured while
performing such work is not entitled to compensation under the Act.' 1
But if the painter is employed by a general contractor as one of his
workmen, and the general contractor reserves the right to direct the
work, the painter would be deemed an employee of the general con-
tractor and may recover compensation under the Act.2 2
The practicing attorney will meet the question as to whether or not
a claimant for damages because of personal injury is to be classified
as an employee or as an independent contractor most frequently in
cases where the injuries are claimed to have been suffered by reason
of the negligence of the person for whom the work was done.
The employee of an independent contractor may recover damages
for an injury in a common law action against the person for whom the
employer is performing services, where the neglignce of such person
proximately caused the injury.23
(b) Manner of Employment:
It is only essential to recovery under the Act that the employee at
the time of the claimed injury was performing services for the em-
1 Neitz v. Kraft (Wis., 1932), 242 N.W. 163.
'9 Kneeland McLurg Lbr. Co. v. id. Con'im., 193 Wis. 409, 220 N.VAT. 199 (1927).
20Medford Lbr. Co. v. Mahner, 197 Wis. 35, 221 N.W. 390 (1928).
21 Weyauwega v. id. Coinim., 180 Wis. 168, 192 N.W. 452 (1923).
22C. R. Meyer & Sons Co. v. Grady, 194 Wis. 615, 217 N.W. 408 (1928).
2s Culbertson v. Kieckhefer Co., 197 Wis. 349, 222 N.W. 249 (1928) ; Cermak v.
Milw. A. P. P. Co., 192 Wis. 44, 211 N.W. 354 (1927).
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ployer in the usual course of the employer's business. Where one em-
ployer lends the services of one of his employees to another employer,
and the employee, expressly or impliedly, consents thereto, the second
employer is liable for compensation, although he does not pay the
employee for his services. In such case the latter employer is known
as the "special employer."
24
Under the Act "helpers and assistants of employees" are entitled to
compensation for injury from the principal employer. The rule seems
to be that if the principal employer accepts valuable services of such
helper, there is a resulting implied promise on the part of the employer
to make reasonable compensation therefor, and therefore the relation
of employer and employee exists within the contemplation of the Act.2 5
In reaching a proper determination of this question of whether the
relation of employer and employee exists in any given case, it is im-
portant to remember that the liability to compensation does not depend
on the length of time of employment-the only requirement being that
the services are such as are usually performed by an employee. Thus
where the superintendent of a power company instructed his wife to
procure the services of some one to repair a defect in a lighting system,
and the wife called in a volunteer who was killed in performing the
service, such volunteer was held to be an employee who came within
the provisions of the Act, and therefore an action at law for damages
resulting from his death could not be maintained.2 6 While the employ-'
ment may be merely temporary, if the work to be done is in the usual
course of the employer's business, the injured workman is entitled to
compensation.27
Where an outsider is .called in by a regular employee to assist in
the performance of an emergency service for the employer, such out-
sider becomes an employee and as such is entitled to compensation.2
S
The care which an attorney must use in choosing the proper remedy
in cases of this class is best illustrated in the case of Johnson v. Wis-
consin Lumber & Supply Company.29a There a truck driven
by an employee of a lumber company was mired in the highway.
24 Cayll v. Waukesha G. & E. Co., 172 Wis. 554, 179 N.W. 771 (1920) ; Rhine-
lander P. Co. v. mId. Comm., 206 Wis. 215, 239 N.W. 412 (1931); Seaman
Body Corp. v. lid. Comm., 204 Wis. 157, 235 N.W. 433 (1931); Spodick v.
Nash Motors Co., 203 Wis. 211, 232 N.W. 870, (1931).
25 National Film Service v. Ind. Comn., 206 Wis. 12, 238 N.W. 904 (1931).
2 6 Heist v. Wis.-Minn. L. & P. Co., 172 Wis. 393, 179 N.W. 583 (1920).
27 Holnen C. Assn. v. hid. Comm., 167 Wis. 470, 167 N.W. 808 (1918) ; F. C.
Gross & Bros. Co. v. Imd. Cnnsni, 167 Wis. 612, 167 N.W. 809 (1918); Hasen-
fuss v. Id. Cammre., 184 Wis. 281, 199 N.W. 158 (1924); Ronning v. Rd.
Commrie., 185 Wis. 384, 200 N.W. 652 (1925).
28 Conveyors Corp. v. Rd. Comm., 200 Wis. 512, 228 N.W. 118 (1930).
29a 203 Wis. 304, 234 N.W. 506 (1931).
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The driver, under instructions from his employer, called in the
plaintiff, a neighboring farmer, to assist him. The plaintiff was serious-
ly injured and brought suit against the employer claiming negligence
on the part of the driver. The court held that plaintiff was an employee
of the defendant, and that his exclusive remedy was under the Work-
men's Compensation Act and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court
said, "If the plaintiff were here claiming under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, we should be obliged to overrule a long line of prior
decisions of this court if it were to be denied him. While in this case,
the plaintiff having been engaged in rendering friendly assistance, it
may operate to his financial disadvantage, that is one of the conse-
quences which follows from the very broad and general language of the
statute and the very liberal construction which has been placed upon
it. Where an injured workman would, in the absence of the Act, have
a right of action at common law for damages, his possible damages
are no doubt reduced by the application of the Act. On the other hand,
in a very much larger number of cases, workmen are given compensa-
tion where at common law they would be entitled to none. The Legis-
lature must have weighed the benefits and detriments of this situation
and made the provision of the law broad and inclusive, as it is, in
order to do the greatest good to the greatest number, and enjoined
upon the courts a liberal construction of the Act to secure the ends for
which it is adopted."
WHAT IS "SERVICE GROWING OUT OF AND INCIDENTAL" TO
EMPLOYMENT?
Generally speaking, an employee can recover under the Act when-
ever he is injured while performing services under the employer's con-
trol and under his direction. Many cases have arisen, however, where
the courts have been called upon to determine the scope of the Act
in this particular-a few of such examples are noteworthy.
A painting contractor requested one of his workmen, hired as a
painter, to haul some furniture to the contractor's summer cottage and
while engaged in that work, the employee was injured. The court held
that, because there was an existing employment, towit, that in con-
nection with the painting business, the employee should not be excluded
from compensation merely because he was injured while temporarily
performing services not usual to the employment. 29 The court distin-
guishes that case from one where compensation under the Act was re-
fused to a workman who was temporarily employed by an implement
dealer to cut down a tree on property belonging to the employer, on
29Metzger v. Koefler, 205 Wis. 339, 235 N.W. 802 (1931).
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the ground that in the latter case there was no existing employment of
the injured man, but he was hired merely for the tree cutting, which
was not work in the usual course of the employer's trade or business.30
It would seem that if the tree cutter in the latter case had been a regu-
lar employee in the usual course of business, he would have been en-
titled to compensation. An employee who went from his place of em-
ployment to another part of a plant to assist in extinguishing a fire
was held to be entitled to compensation. 31 An employee injured on the
employer's premises while making a tool box for his own tools used in
his employment is performing work incidental to his employment.
32
Recovery was had by an employee putting up cordwood on the em-
ployer's premises for his own use where as part of his compensation
he was to have "wood and house rent free."33
An employee who is traveling primarily on business or pleasure of
his own, but who performs some incidental service for his employer,
is not entitled to compensation if injured on the tlip,34 but if an em-
ployee is on a trip undertaken on behalf of the employer and is injured
while on such trip, he is entitled to compensation, even though during
the course of the trip he transact some personal business. 35
The testing and repairing of an automobile used in the business of
an employer is a service within the scope of the employment, regardless
of the fact that the automobile is not owned by the employer but is
merely used by him to transact his business. 36
Under this head, we should also examine the cases construing that
portion of the Act which provides "Every employee going to and from
his employment in the ordinary and usual way, while on the premises of
his employer, shall be deemed to be performing service growing out of
and incidental to his employment."
37
An employee going to work, injured while walking on a public side-
walk twenty feet from the entrance to employer's plant was held not to
be on the employer's premises.38 But where the employer uses as a
part of his premises a piece of ground which has been dedicated to the
public as a public highway, an employee who was injured on such part
so Ploetz & Co. v. Imd. Cerewm., 194 Wis. 603, 217 N.W. 325 (1928).
31 Belle City M. I. Co. v. Rowland, 170 Wis. 293, 174 N.W. 899 (1919).
32 Kimberly Clark Co. v. imd. Comm., 187 Wis. 53, 203 N.W. 737 (1925).
33 Kraft v. Ind. Co nur., 201 Wis. 339, 230 N.W. 36 (1930).
3 Barragar v. Id. Comrin., 205 Wis. 550, 238 N.W. 368 (1931).
3 Schmiedke v. Four Wheel D. A. Co., 192 Wis. 574, 213 N.W. 292 (1927).
36 Columbia Co. G. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 201 Wis. 301, 230 N.W. 40 (1930).
37 Sec. 102.03, Wis. Stats.
38 Krebs v. id. Comm., 200 Wis. 134, 227 N.W. 287 (1929).
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while riding a bicycle on his way home after work was allowed com-
pensation.A9
There are cases where the nature of the work does not call for use
of premises owned by the employer, such as the employment of a
traveling salesman. In that class of cases the employee is deemed to
be engaged in his employment while on his way to call on customers.4"
Employees of a municipality are deemed to be engaged in their employ-
ment while using streets of the municipality after reporting for duty
in going to and from work.41
Where the employment contract includes transportation to and from
work the relationship of employer and employee exists during the act
of such transportation. 42
But where a city street cleaner is going to the place where he is
required to report for duty, he is not considered to be on his employer's
premises within the meaning of the statute.43
A paid city fireman going to report for work at his engine house
over a city street is not considered to be on the premises of his em-
ployer, 44 but a volunteer fireman responding to a fire alarm is deemed
to have entered upon his employment. 45
The test therefore seems to be that where the place of employment
is ambulatory in its nature, the employee is deemed to be engaged in
his employer's business from the moment he starts for work; while if
the place of employment involves what may be termed fixed headquar-
ters, the employee is not deemed to be at work unless he is actually on
the employer's premises, or has first reported there and is at the time of
injury engaged in the employment.
An employee after finishing his work, going for his pay to a place
designated by the employer, but using means of transportation fur-
nished by the employer is held to be performing a service within the
scope of his employment. 46
An employee eating his lunch on the employer's premises, pursuant




9Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Ind. Coamm., 197 Wis. 48, 221 N.W. 396 (1928).
40 U. S. C. Co. v. Superior H. Co., 175 Wis. 162, 184 N.W. 694 (1921) ; Schroeder
& Daly Lb9. Co. v. Ind. Co'nvr., 169 Wis. 567, 173 N.W. 328 (1919); Val
Blatz Brg. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 201 Wis. 474, 230 N.W. 622 (1931).
41 Milwaukee v. Ind. Comm., 185 Wis. 311, 201 N.W. 240 (1924) ; Monroe Co. v.
id. Ca',nm., 184 Wis. 32, 198 N.W. 597 (1924).
42 Rock Co. v. Ind. Comn., 185 Wis. 134, 200 N.W. 657 (1924).
43 Caravella v. Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 190, 215 N.W. 911 (1927).44 Hormburg v. Morris, 163 Wis. 31, 157 N.W. 556 (1916).
45 West Bend v. Ind. Comm., 202 Wis. 319, 232 N.W. 524 (1930).
46 Hackley-Phelps-Bonnell Co. v. Ind. Cowmn., 165 Wis. 586, 162 N.W. 921 (1917).
47Racine Rubber Co. v. Id. Comwm., 165 Wis. 600, 162 N.W. 664 (1917).
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WHAT IS INCLUDED IN THE TERM "INJURY"?
Under the express provisions of the statute "injury" is mental or
physical harm to an employee and is extended to and includes diseases
growing out of and incidental to the employment.4 8 This provision of
the statutes has received a very liberal construction by the Industrial
Commission and by the courts. Only a few of the specific cases will
be treated here.
(a) Occupational Diseases:
The term "occupational disease" has been applied to "diseases
growing out of and incidental" to the employment. It is obvious that if
the industry should compensate labor for accidental injury causing dis-
ability, that it should also compensate labor for the suffering and
disability caused by an occupational disease. Certain employments par-
ticularly have been found to be attended with decided risk to health,
such as granite cutting and foundry work. In those employments work-
men inhale much dust which in time injures the lungs and makes the
subjects peculiarly susceptible to tuberculosis and allied diseases. Dis-
eases of that nature, however, do not ordinarily become disabling until
several years exposure. In many cases employees, having actually in-
curred the disease under one employer, take up service with a subse-
quent employer. In other cases, though the same employer is continued,
that employer carries his compensation insurance in different insurance
companies.
The very troublesome question then arises as to which employer or
which insurance carrier shall pay compensation. The first rulings of the
Supreme Court were to the effect that the employee suffering from an
occupational disease should be deemed not entitled to compensation
until he was forced, because of disease, to give up his employment, and
therefore the employer or insurance carrier on that date was com-
pelled to pay compensation.4
9
It will be seen that such ruling was illogical in that it threw the
entire burden of loss on the last employer or insurance carrier, without
any consideration of the extent to which the diseased employee has
been exposed by such last employer or during the period of insurance
coverage. The Supreme Court therefore gave the whole matter full
consideration and finally announced this rule.
"Upon a full reconsideration of the entire matter, it is considered
that it should be held that the 'time of accident' within the meaning of
48 Sec. 102.01, Wis. Stats.
49 Wenrich v. mid. Comm., 182 Wis. 379, 196 N.W. 824 (1924) ; Schaeffer v. I1d.
Co-mm., 185 Wis. 317, 201 N.W. 396 (1924) ; Employers Mit. L. Ins. Co. v.
Iud. Conim., 195 Wis. 410, 217 N.W. 738 (1928); Montello Granite v. I1d.
Co-mm., 197 Wis. 428, 222 N.W. 315 (1928).
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the statute in occupational disease cases should be the time when dis-
ability first occurs; that the employer in whose employment the in-
jured workman is and the insurance carrier at that time are liable for
the total consequences due thereto. So that if the end result, whatever
it may be, is inevitably due to exposure already complete, that employer
and that carrier become liable accordingly. If the disability is partial
and there is a recovery and a subsequent disability with subsequent
exposure, then it will be necessary for the commission to determine
whether the subsequent disability arose from a recurrence or is due to
a new onset induced by a subsequent exposure. If it finds that the dis-
ability is due to a new onset, the employer and the carrier on the risk
at the time the total disability manifests itself shall be liable accord-
ingly. If, however, there is no subsequent exposure which contributes
to the disability and the disability is a recurrence of the former occu-
pational disease, then the employer in whose employment the employee
is when the recurrence takes place is not liable and so the insurance
carrier upon the risk at that time is not liable on that account."5
The court has pointed out that the rule thus announced does not
take care of cases where the diseased employee succumbs to the disease
during a period of unemployment: "We take this occasion to empha-
size again, as we have many times in the past, that the right of an em-
ployee to compensation for an occupational disease hangs by a slender
thread, in view of the very cursory statutory provisions upon which
that right must rest. It has required no little judicial ingenuity to save
the right in many cases when the Legislature seemed to intend compen-
sation to be made. It is realized full well here that most any time
judicial ingenuity will be baffled, and there may come a time when a
worthy employee must go uncompensated because of the failure of the
Legislature to grapple with the subject in a specific and definite way."51
Such an exceptional case very recently came to the Supreme Court.
The employee had been employed by one company for thirteen years
as a sandblaster. During the last two years of such employment he
noticed that he coughed and became short of wind but did not at any
time quit work on that account. The company ceased operations, and
after a period of idleness the man undertook work of a nature which
did not contribute to lung trouble and after working there for a short
time became ill and was found to have diseased lungs due to his long
exposure to dust in the first employment. The employee sought com-
pensation from his first employer. The court held that no compensation
could be allowed, because the employee did not actually become dis-
abled while in such first employment.52 As to occupational diseases,
50 Zurich etc. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 203 Wis. 135 at p. 146, 233 N.W. 772 (1930).
51 Nordberg Mfg. Co. v. Ind. Comm., (Wis. 1932), 245 N.W. 680 at p. 681.
52-Ma ss. etc. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Comm., (Wis. 1933), No. 28, p. 5, Jr. St. Gov't Serv-
ice, Mar. 11, 1933.
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therefore, the present judicial construction of the statute is to base the
liability to pay compensation upon disability and not upon exposure. 53
The suggestion made by the court to the legislature no doubt will be
heeded, and we may look for some amendment of the statute which
,h ill give the Industrial Commission authority to determine, with the
.L I of medical testimony, what particular employment during the years
ul development of an occupational disease was responsible for such
di,ease, with, perhaps, provision made for an apportionment of the
lo s among successive employers whose work exposed the employee to
hazard both in the inception of the disease and its development.
Where an employee is working for two or more employers concur-
rently, all are liable to pay compensation for disability arising during
the period of concurrent employment, and they may be assessed in pro-
portion to the time the employee gives each employer.54
There have been a number of cases considered by the court involv-
ing diseases or ailments which result from a single exposure. In this
class it is frequently difficult to prove thaf the ailment was caused by
the employment. The general rule of law that a finding of liability
cannot rest upon mere speculation and conjecture frequently defeats
such claims.
5 5
Where it is shown that an employee during the course of his em-
ployment, drank water furnished by the employer, and that such water
was polluted with bacteria from which the employee contracted typhoid,
such disease is deemed attributable to accident and for the resulting
wage loss to the employee the employer must pay compensation.58
In all cases where disease follows as the natural and probable
result of an accident, the employee is entitled to compensation under
the Act.
57
In one case, an employee sustained an injury to his leg by reason
of which he was confined to a hospital, where he developed smallpox
from which he died. There was testimony by the physician in charge
that his death was partially induced by the accident. An award of
compensation was made by the commission and affirmed by the cir-
cuit court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, only six judges heard the
53 Kunlick Rug Corp. v. Stansfield, (Wis. 1933), 246 N.W. 424.
54 Schaefer v. mId. Co-mm., supra.
5 Voelz v. Ind. Comm., 161 Wis. 240, 152 N.W. 830 (1915).
56 Vennen v. New Dells Lbr. Co., 161 Wis. 370, 154 N.W. 640 (1915).
57 Scott & Howe Lbr. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 184 Wis. 276,.199 N.W. 159 (1924)
Heileman v. bid. Cowmm., 161 Wis. 46, 152 N.W. 446 (1915) ; Eagle Chiem. Co
v. Nowak, 161 Wis. 446, 154 N.W. 636 (1915) ; A. Breslauer Co. v. Id. Comm.,
167 Wis. 202, 167 N.W. 256 (1918).
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case. Three of the judges favored affirmance and three were for re-
versal, so under the rule the award was confirmed.58
Hernia may be caused by constant lifting and consequent strain,
and an employee suffering from that ailment caused in that manner
may recover compensation, hernia there being treated as an "occupa-
tional disease. ' 5 In cases where it is claimed the hernia was caused by
a single accident, the Supreme Court has approved the practice of re-
quiring definite proof 'that the hernia was caused by accident, that the
accident was such as might cause it, that the hernia appeared immedi-
ately after the accident, follwed by pain disabling the applicant.6 0
Predisposition to a certain ailment or disease which becomes active
by reason of an accident does not defeat the claim to compensation.6 1
But where one employee becomes disabled by an occupational disease
which is due to a former employment and which is not aggravated or
accelerated by employment under a subsequent employer, the latter can-
not be held liable for compensation.62
(b) Miscellaneous Hazards:
Death or injury to an employee resulting from lightning has been
held to be compensable under the Act where such hazard is deemed
incidental to the employment. Thus where the employee was forced to
take shelter under a tree, or in a building, during a storm and was
there struck, he was held entitled to compensation,6 3 though in an
earlier case where the employee was struck while working in the rain
on a dam, it was held that the hazard of lightning was not increased
by reason of his employment.64 The student may have some difficulty
in harmonizing these cases, but it must be noted that the Supreme
Court bases its decisions upon the rule that it cannot disturb what
the Industrial Commission has found as a fact.
Freezing has likewise been held to be a risk which may be consid-
ered incidental to particular employments.6 5
Where a teamster had taken his horses to the barn as a storm came
up and was killed in the collapse of the barn due to the storm, the
Supreme Court sustained the denial of compensation on the ground
58 Schafer v. Ind. Comm., 191 Wis. 186, 210 N.W. 359 (1926).
59Marathon Paper Mills Co. v. Ind. Covm'., 203 Wis. 17, 233 N.W. 558 (1930).60Meade v. Wisconsin M. Co., 168 Wis. 250, 169 N.W. 619 (1918).
61 Casper Cone Co. v. Ind. Comm., 165 Wis. 255, 161 N.W. 784 (1917); Hackley-
Phelps-Bonnell Co. v. Ind. Comm. 173 Wis. 128, 179 N.W. 590 (1921).
63 Hayes v Ajax R. Co., 202 Wis. 218, 231 N.V. 584 (1930).
63Newman v. Ind. Comnm., 203 Wis. 358, 234 N.W. 495 (1931); Nebraska Seed
Co. v. Ind. Coninn., 206 Wis. 199, 239 N.W. 432 (1931).
64 Hoenig v. Ind. Corm., 159 Wis. 646, 150 N.W. 996 (1915).
65 Ellingson Lbr. Co. v. Ind. Canim., 168 Wis. 227, 169 N.W. 568 (1918) ; Eagle
River B. & S. Co. v. Ind. Cam., 199 Wis. 192, 225 N.W. 690 (1929).
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that the hazard was one common to the public and not peculiar to the
employment,66 but the Supreme Court in a later case criticized the use
of the words "peculiar to the employment," holding that compensable
injuries may result from "hazards inseparably connected with the em-
ployment and therefore incidental to it. ' ' 67
The Supreme Court affirmed an order of the Industrial Commission
denying compensation to a coal heaver who suffered a sunstroke while
at work on the ground that the stroke was not due to a "hazard inci-
dental or peculiar to his employment." 6 Again it will be noted that the
Supreme Court merely held that it could not ignore the findings of fact
of the Industrial Commission. In view of the later decisions, injury by
sunstroke suffered during an outdoor employment may more properly
be considered compensable.
It will be therefore observed that no hard and fast rule of law
governs the question of compensation for injury or death caused by
such events as lightning, sunstroke, freezing and storms, but, in each
instance liability rests upon what the fact may be as to the causal
connection between the employment and the exposure-to such hazards.
LIABILITY OF TnR.D PARTIES
The statute now provides that injured employees or personal repre-
sentatives may maintain an action for damages against a third party
for the same injuries for which the employee may receive compensa-
tion, but opportunity must be given to the employer or insurance car-
rier, upon whom liability rests to pay compensation, to join in such
action. In the event of recovery of damages against such third party,
after deduction of the reasonable costs of collection, one-third of the
remainder goes to the employee or his dependents in any event; the
employer or insurance carrier shall be repaid out of the other two-
thirds such amounts as may have been paid for compensation and any
balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his dependents.
The employer or insurance carrier who has paid compensation may
also maintain such an action against a third party, and if reasonable
opportunity has been given to the compensation beneficiary, the liability
of the third party to him shall also be determined. The division of the
proceeds is the same.
Any settlement of such a claim and the distribution of the proceeds
shall have the approval of the Industrial Commission or the court.
66 Carey v. Ind. Comm., 181 Wis. 253, 194 N.W. 339 (1923).
67 Eagle River, etc. Co. v. Ind. Comtn., supra; See also Schroeder & Daly Co. v.
Ind. Comm., supra.
68 Lewis v. Ind. Covwt., 178 Wis. 449, 190 N.W. 101 (1922).
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The employee may also maintain an independent action against
any physician or surgeon for malpractice in treatment of the injuries
or disease, but there shall be deducted from the damages such compen-
sation as may have been paid to the employee. 69
Prior to Chapter 132 of the Laws of Wisconsin, 1931, the Act pro-
vided that the making of a claim for compensation against the employ-
er operated as an assignment of the whole claim to the employer or
insurance carrier, who then had the first right to commence such action.
If such action was not commenced by either of them, then the employer
or his representatives were given the right to demand the commence-
ment of the action and unless commenced within ninety days, or right
to commence waived, the employee or his representatives were given
the right to institute the same.7 0 The former statute also provided that
the employee could elect whether to seek compensation under the Act
or pursue his remedy against the third party, and that if he elected to
take the latter course he waived his right to compensation. 71 Attention
is called to these changes to avoid confusion.
The term "third party" includes a principal contractor and the em-
ployee of a subcontractor may sue such principal contractor for dam-
ages in a tort action, notwithstanding the fact that such principal con-
tractor would be liable for compensation to such employee in the event
the subcontractor carried no insurance or did not pay the compensa-
tion.7 1
An injured employee may also sue a negligent co-employee. 73
As an employer's liability, even for accidents caused by his negli-
gence, is limited to compensation provided by the Act, the employer
cannot be interpleaded as a joint tort-feasor in an action against a
third party whose negligence also contributed to the accident. The
reason for this rule is that there is no common liability to the injured
employee and therefore no legal claim for contribution by the negli-
gent third party against the negligent employer. 74
In conclusion, it might be said that the Supreme Court has given
a liberal interpretation to the provisions of the Act in accord with the
spirit which prompted its passage. Some difficulties in construction
have arisen, and some apparently contrary decisions. The Act has in
69 Sec. 102.29, Wis. Stats.
-°Pazlak v. Hayes, 162 Wis. 503, 156 N.W. 464 (1916) ; Saudek v. Milwaukee,
163 Wis. 109, 157 N.W. 579 (1916).
71 Miller Scrap Iron Co. v. Boucher, 173 Wis. 257, 180 N.W. 826 (1921).
72 Cermak v. Milwaukee A. P. P. Co., supra.
73McGonigle v. Gryphan, 201 Wis. 269, 229 N.W. 81 (1930).
74 Dansbery v. N. S. P. Co., 188 Wis. 586, 206 N.W. 882 (1926) ; Puggs v. Wolf,
201 Wis. 533, 230 N.W. 621 (1930).
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a few places proved too inflexible, and its provisions have failed to
cover all the situations which apparently merit relief, chief among these
being the troublesome question of occupational diseases; but it has
nevertheless been on the whole quite adequate and represents a dis-
tinct advancement of the theory that labor should be given security by
those who enjoy its benefits.
